Secure Source-Code Review
Manual source-code review of security-sensitive code, with emphasis on authorization, data flow, trust boundaries, and exploitable implementation flaws.
Independent Application Security Research
I’m Duy Tran, an application security researcher focused on source-code review, authorization boundaries, web/API security, and practical vulnerability validation. I work through authorized testing and coordinated disclosure.
What I do
Engagements are scoped around concrete attack surfaces and security questions rather than generic scanner output.
Manual source-code review of security-sensitive code, with emphasis on authorization, data flow, trust boundaries, and exploitable implementation flaws.
Targeted testing for broken access control, authentication weaknesses, business-logic flaws, unsafe file handling, and other application-layer risks.
Review of a feature, patch, architecture decision, or suspected vulnerability when a team needs a narrow technical answer instead of a broad assessment.
Research
My research archive documents public vulnerability disclosures, CVE write-ups, technical validation, and the reasoning behind security findings.
Method
Identify assets, actors, attack surfaces, trust assumptions, and the security question being tested.
Follow attacker-controlled data through authentication, authorization, persistence, and sensitive sinks.
Use controlled runtime testing and negative controls to distinguish reachable impact from suspicious code.
Document reproducible findings, affected boundaries, impact, and remediation guidance without unsupported claims.
Newsfeed
The original blog feed stays here as the living stream of new research and learning posts.
A researcher-side critique of Patchstack's shared bounty pool, duplicate risk, XP dilution, rejection penalties, leaderboard incentives, and the economics of vulnerability research.
Read postWhen I review an unfamiliar codebase, I prioritize broken authorization, trust-boundary failures, alternate interfaces, sensitive state transitions, and data-lifecycle mistakes before cha...
Read postFiboSearch exposed password-protected WooCommerce products through autocomplete search responses when the request came from a logged-in Subscriber session that had not entered the product...
Read postTaxoPress before 3.51.0 allowed Contributor-level users to reference private posts in the AI Preview workflow and receive output derived from posts they were not authorized to read.
Read postMeta Box versions before 5.13.1 allowed authenticated users with access to a file-field workflow to delete attachments belonging to other users because the deletion endpoint trusted reque...
Read postBeginner-friendly notes on virtualization, hypervisors, VMs, containers, cloud computing models, shared responsibility, cloud monitoring, and common cloud security mistakes.
Read postEverest Forms versions up to 3.4.8 could leave generated CSV submission artifacts in a public uploads directory after a multi-notification email workflow, exposing form data to unauthenti...
Read postSimple Membership 4.7.4 accepted unauthenticated forged Stripe webhook metadata when the signing secret was empty, then rendered the stored API version in an administrator notice without ...
Read postSecurity review
Send the product or repository context, technology stack, intended scope, and the security questions you want answered.
Authorized engagements only. Scope and testing boundaries are agreed before active security testing begins.